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The Armenian Genocide of 1915 from a
Neutral Small State’s Perspective: Sweden1
Vahagn Avedian
Chief Editor, Armenica.org
This study depicts how the Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire during
World War I were perceived by a neutral small state, namely, Sweden. The
Swedish knowledge should be of special interest since, as a neutral state during
the entire conflict, Sweden had no immediate involvement or interest in the
ongoing conflict; thus, any reporting about the events would have been untainted
compared to that of the Entente or Turkey’s allies. The information at hand is
also essential to an understanding of the subsequent Swedish reaction. However,
surveying the full amount of information needed for comprehensively understand-
ing and analyzing the response to the massacres is beyond the scope of this article
and requires a larger study. This article, therefore, addresses the first part,
namely charting the information at hand, while the analysis of the response,
especially a neutral small state’s during an ongoing global conflict, will be left to
future studies. The surveyed information in this study shows that information
about the Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire was abundant.
Key words: Armenian Genocide, Sweden, neutral small state
‘‘And look what it says here. The first who were called wogs [svartskallar] were
Armenian beggars. They were thrown out from Sweden since it was forbidden to
beg.’’2 The beggars in question were Armenian survivors from the massacres in the
Ottoman Empire.
Today, the Republic of Turkey dismisses almost every historic document pre-
sented by the Entente powers of World War I as war propaganda, which they see as
serving the sole purpose of defaming Turkey. Turkish documents on the subject, on
the other hand, are dismissed by genocide scholars as unreliable, since they are the
Turkish government’s falsification and a cover-up.3 Having said that, it should
be mentioned that research on German and Austrian documents, allies of Turkey
during the Great War, confirms the Entente’s version, rather than that of Turkey.4
A neutral nation’s observations of the event, however, should be free of any allega-
tions of bias from either side in the conflict. One such nation was the USA, which
remained neutral in the conflict until April 1917. The reports and observations
made by the US Embassy and American missionaries and relief workers throughout
Turkey constitute an important part of the data about the Armenian massacres,
since the Americans were the only major power (except Germany and Austria) left
inside Turkey after the outbreak of the war. Their presence in Turkey, as well as
their neutrality, ended in April 1917 when USA entered the war on the Entente’s
side. Sweden, on the other hand, remained neutral during the entire conflict and
its reports and subsequent actions cannot be ascribed to Swedish involvement in
a specific war camp. The full scope of such a study would be to find out how much
Sweden knew about the massacres, what alternative actions could have been taken,
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what alternatives Sweden chose, and why. However, in order to conduct this study
within the given limitations, this article will concentrate on the contents of the
reports and the information and the analysis that reached Sweden in regard to
the Armenian massacres and the fate of Armenia, leaving the three subsequent
questions to future studies.
The Swedish Press, Christian Missions, Military Missions,
and Embassy Reports
During World War I, the Swedish press dedicated much space to the war efforts,
as did the press in other countries. Among others, a special bureau was created to
provide the Swedish countryside papers with articles from the German press. ‘‘About
fifty papers were among the receivers, mostly conservative publications organs, but
also a number of liberal papers.’’5 The fact that such a large number of newspapers
were under German influence should have affected the reporting of events on
Turkey. In order to further influence Swedish opinion, Germany secretly purchased
the majority of the shares in the newspapers Aftonbladet and Dagen. With a total
circulation of 92,000, these newspapers equaled the circulation of the Entente-
friendly Dagens Nyheter and Social-Demokraten.6 This could explain why the news
of the massacres in Armenia was a relatively small event in the reports from the
front. The resources of the Swedish newspapers were not adequate to employ foreign
correspondents of their own. This meant that much of the news concerning foreign
affairs was acquired from foreign news agencies, often coloring the perspective
of the reports. However, until Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany, the leading
Swedish publications’ foreign policy aimed less at influencing public opinion and
more toward debating and providing orientation concerning prevailing international
affairs.7
While the information published by the newspapers was ‘‘second-hand intelli-
gence’’ acquired from foreign news agencies, there were more reliable information
sources documented by individuals present in Turkey. These documents were the
reports and dispatches by Swedish missionaries in Turkey and the Caucasus, the
Swedish Ambassador to Turkey, and the Swedish Military Attache´ in Constan-
tinople. These documents are mainly found in the National Archives, but some are
published as memoirs as well.
The material belonging to the Swedish missionaries has been collected from
several sources: pamphlets, brochures, and books published during the period of
1915–1923; as well as memoirs published later, which contain eyewitness accounts
and stories of the studied period; letters and reports from the missionaries in the
field that were sent to the Swedish Church reporting about the status of the
missions, as well as depicting the situation in their parish. These documents were
found in the Missionary Archive administered partly by the Church of Sweden and
partly by the Swedish National Archives.
The reports and the warnings issued by the Swedish missionaries in Turkey and
the Caucasus date to the end of the nineteenth century and to the massacres of
1894–1896.8 Searching through the missionary correspondence for the period 1914–
1917 did not, however, reveal any special information. An examination of the letters
showed that the volume, especially from Turkey, decreased dramatically, with the
engagement in the Great War. Stationed in Mush, Western Armenia, beginning in
1910, Alma Johansson, for example, wrote about two to three letters a month to
Sweden. During the entire period of 1914–1917, however, there were only four
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letters from her in the archives.9 The archivist at Svenska Missionskyrkan (the
Mission Covenant Church of Sweden), Katarina Thurell, explained that the lack of
information from missionaries all over Europe during World War I was a common
phenomenon. The reasons were many: the war forced many missionaries to leave
their field missions, and at the same time resulted in communication difficulties;
scarce information was also due to wartime censorship and control of the information
flow. Letters from missionaries had to pass through military channels. This cen-
sorship resulted in letters arriving several months, or longer, after they had been
written. Some may never have reached their destination. While it is true that
German and Austrian missionaries remained in the area until the end of the war,
the censorship by the German and Austrian governments, in regard to the ongoing
war effort in general and the reputation of the Turkish ally in particular, strictly
prohibited any publication of the information and observations the missionaries
relayed back home.
Two larger publications in the form of booklets were Blod och ta˚rar: Armeniernas
lidanden i Turkiet (‘‘Blood and Tears: The Sufferings of Armenians in Turkey’’) and
Vad en tysk lektor i asiatiska Turkiet upplevde i 1915 (‘‘What a German Senior
Lecturer in Asian Turkey Experienced during 1915’’). The first is a collection of
testimonies, letters, and articles from different medical personnel, missionaries,
soldiers, and Armenian survivors about the massacres in the Ottoman Empire, and
not all the sources provide first-hand information. The second booklet depicts the
experiences of Dr. Martin Niepage, an upper-grade teacher in the German Technical
School at Aleppo. His article concentrates mainly on information that should be
regarded as more reliable, as it excludes much information attained by hearsay.
Both booklets’ contents give an interesting insight into the events, both as first-
hand testimonies as well as analysis of how the massacres were perceived. In addi-
tion, there are some other non-Swedish witness accounts, translated and published
in Sweden, that are included in the present study.
The Swedish missionary reports, letters, and pamphlets were yet another means
of affecting public opinion, mainly by initiating and persuading the civilian Swedes
to contribute to humanitarian aid and collections for the benefit of the victims and
survivors of the Armenian massacres. However, they could also indicate the Swedish
Church’s knowledge of events and its choice of action regarding the massacres, as
well as the actions of the missionaries in Western Armenia.
Moving further up the ‘‘reliability scale’’ of the reports and their impact on the
Swedish state’s knowledge of and basis for decision making are the Swedish military
personnel’s reports. The most frequently cited Swedish military testimony, used by
deniers of the Armenian genocide, is that of Major Gustav Hjalmar Pravitz. He was
actually stationed in Persia, not in the Ottoman Empire. Pravitz was a member
of the Swedish military mission invited to improve Persia’s gendarmerie and police
operations.10 In 1918, Pravitz published his memoirs, Fra˚n Persien i stiltje och storm
(‘‘From Persia in Calm and Storm’’); however, he published one passage of the book
a year earlier in Nya Dagligt Allehanda (NDA),11 where he made an interesting
assertion: ‘‘I guess generally, one can say that a continuous, even if somewhat
milder, persecution is less bearable to endure than a bloody but quick act of
despotism, as in assaults of the kind that from time to time put Europe’s attention
on the Armenian question.’’12 During his journey through Turkey to reach Persia,
Pravitz admitted that he had seen dead bodies and dying people begging for a piece
of bread, but, with the exception of one case, he did not see the alleged violence used
against the Armenian ‘‘emigrants.’’13 He also mentions meeting an Armenian in a
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concentration camp (‘‘koncentrationsla¨ger’’), itself an interesting choice of word in
the context of this study.14 In order to be able to put Pravitz’s observations and
interpretation of the Armenian situation in perspective, it is necessary to also reflect
upon his personal view about the Armenian people. In his book, Pravitz renders his
views regarding Persia, Persians, and the minorities living in the country. A large
portion of the first part of chapter ten, entitled ‘‘My Second Journey to Persia,’’ in
which he describes the ‘‘Armenian question,’’ has more or less the same content
as his article in Nya Dagligt Allehanda. Moreover, his description of the Armenian
element is not flattering. Jews and Armenians are described as ‘‘lying merchants’’
and Armenians as ‘‘highly untrustworthy.’’15 In general, he writes that the ‘‘bloody’’
measures of the Turkish government toward the ‘‘disloyal’’ Armenians were quite
justified, even though innocent people had suffered too.16 The parallels to the argu-
mentation about the Holocaust are too striking to be ignored.
Notwithstanding, the study of the Swedish War Archive reveals another, quite
opposite, perspective, expressed by someone much closer to the events, namely, that
of Captain Einar af Wirse´n (later Major), the official Swedish Military Attache´ in
Constantinople, 1915–1920.17 In his memoirs, Minnen fra˚n fred och krig (‘‘Memories
from Peace and War’’), published in 1942, referring to Talaat’s somewhat gruesome
humor, he mentions the following answer Talaat gave him in regard to the Armenian
massacres: ‘‘I see in the Times that we would have executed, or in other ways killed
none less than 800,000 Armenians. I assure you that this is untrue, it was only
600,000.’’18 Djemal Pasha, however, was more moderate and ‘‘disliked the massacres
of the Armenians.’’19 The book is based upon Wirse´n’s experiences and memoirs
during his service as military attache´ in the Balkans and Turkey. Here he demon-
strated in more detail his knowledge of the Armenian genocide. Although published
in 1942, the book gives insight into how the events were understood by the official
Swedish Military Attache´ in Turkey when they happened. In the chapter Mordet pa˚
en nation (‘‘The Murder of a Nation’’), Wirse´n gives a brief review of the background
to the Armenian question, before describing the atrocities committed by the Turkish
government during the war.20 He found the accusations of Armenian collaboration
with the Russians questionable.21 The subsequent deportations were nothing but
a cover for the extermination: ‘‘Officially, these had the goal of moving the entire
Armenian population to the steppe regions of Northern Mesopotamia and Syria,
but in reality they aimed to exterminate [utrota] the Armenians, whereby the pure
Turkish element in Asia Minor would achieve a dominating position.’’22 Wirse´n
points out that the orders were given with utter cunning. The communications were
generally given verbally and in extreme secrecy in order to give the government a
free hand in the implementation of the massacres.23 Describing the methods used
for massacring the Armenians and depriving the survivors of basic needs so they
would perish by hunger and disease, Wirse´n notes that the ‘‘annihilation of the
Armenian nation in Asia Minor must revolt all human feelings . . . The way the
Armenian problem was solved was hair-raising. I can still see in front of me Talaat’s
cynical expression, when he emphasized that the Armenian question was solved.’’24
The military reports are of great importance, since the Swedish Military Attache´,
as a representative of a neutral state, was allowed to visit the fronts and gather
information about the ongoing campaigns and actions in the Ottoman Empire. He
received military intelligence reports, dispatched not only by the Turks but also by
the Germans and Austrians serving in the Ottoman Army. The reports show that
Wirse´n took the liberty to make recommendations about certain actions toward both
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Turkey and Germany, which suggests that his analytic reports were of importance to
Swedish foreign policy making.
On 30 April 1915, Sweden’s Ambassador to Constantinople, Per Gustaf August
Cosswa Anckarsva¨rd, wrote a five-page dispatch on the subject of the armeniska
fra˚gan (Armenian question) and the Armenian revolutionary movement. Noting
that the ‘‘ghost of the so-called Armenian question’’ had re-appeared in the interior
parts of the country, Anckarsva¨rd gave a rather detailed chronological description of
the issue.25 Anckarsva¨rd mentions that the Sublime Porte,26 based upon intelligence
information about revolutionary plans, made a mass arrest of about 400 Armenians
in Constantinople and numerous others had been taken into custody in other cities
as well. ‘‘Among the arrested are many Armenian journalists, doctors, and lawyers
especially. They had been sent to Angora [Ankara], awaiting trial in a court
martial.’’27 Anckarsva¨rd was referring to the arrest of the Armenian intellectuals
throughout the Empire, especially in Constantinople.
On 26 May 1915, Svenska Morgonbladet (SvM) published the following telegram
from Paris: ‘‘Since about a month ago, the Kurdish and Turkish populations in
Armenia, in accord with each other and with help from the Turkish Government,
have committed mass murder on Armenians. These have occurred from mid-April
[new style], in Erzurum, Dertsjun [Ter-Djan], Egin, Bitlis, Mush, Sasun, and
others.’’28 On 6 July 1915 Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a two-page report entitled ‘‘The
Armenian Persecutions,’’ a wording used in the title of six other reports during
1915. The dispatch reads as follows:
The persecutions of the Armenians have reached hair-raising proportions and it all
points to the fact that the Young Turks want to seize the opportunity, since there is
no effective external pressure to be feared for various reasons, to once and for all put
an end to the Armenian question. The means for this are quite simple and consist of
the extermination [utrotandet] of the Armenian nation . . . It does not seem to be the
Turkish population that acts on its own accord, but the entire movement originates in
the government institutions and the Young Turks’ Committee, which stands behind
the government and now displays the kinds of ideas they harbor . . . The German
Ambassador has in writing appealed to the Porte, but what can Germany or any other
of the Major Powers do as long as the war continues? That the Central Powers would
threaten Turkey is for the time being unthinkable, and Turkey is already at war with
the majority of the remaining Major Powers.29
Here, for the first time, Anckarsva¨rd pinpoints two important observations: (1) the
mass killings were state orchestrated, with the Committee of Union and Progress30
behind the scene, and (2) their aim was to ‘‘exterminate the Armenian nation.’’ The
atrocities would justify yet another European intervention, but only once the war
was over. The Swedish Ambassador’s analysis of the hopelessness of the situation
also emphasizes Turkey’s knowledge of the window of opportunity, caused partly by
the passivity of its allies and the inability of the world (neutral and hostile nations),
which provided them with an opportunity to implement their ‘‘final solution.’’
Anckarsva¨rd’s report described the basic need of a humanitarian intervention, but
neither the friendly state (Germany) nor other major powers capable of implement-
ing such an intervention were in a position to interfere to stop the genocide.
Soon after, on 15 July 1915, Anckarsva¨rd informed Stockholm of the warning
delivered to the Porte by the German Ambassador about the Armenian massacres.
‘‘Turkey risked, especially among the neutral nations and foremost in America,
evoking an extremely disadvantageous opinion. Furthermore, the unlawfulness and
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excesses of the Turkish government agencies opened the door for Europe’s inter-
vention and its interference in Turkey’s internal affairs as soon as the war ceased.’’31
The issue of a humanitarian intervention was made clear, but it also established the
fact that such an action would, due to the prevailing circumstances, almost certainly
come too late to save the Armenians.
Anckarsva¨rd’s 15 July 1915 report stated that the ‘‘Armenian Patriarch has
asked the Justice and Culture Minister, whether his intention is to annihilate the
entire Armenian nation, in which case he was ready to start a movement to organize
a mass emigration to, among other places, countries in South America. In this way,
the Turks would get rid of the Armenians and the Armenians would suffer somewhat
less than now.’’32 This suggestion was quite similar to the Nazi’s Madagascar plan.33
On 22 July 1915, Anckarsva¨rd informed his foreign ministry that it was not only
the Armenians who were subject to persecutions, but also the Greeks who faced the
same fate. The Greek charge´ d’affaires in Constantinople, Mr. Tsamados, explained
that: ‘‘ it [the deportations] cannot be any other issue other than an annihilation
war against the Greek nation in Turkey, and the measures therefore being taken
are that the Turks have been implementing forced conversions to Islam; the obvious
aim being that, if at the end of the war there would again be a question of European
intervention for the protection of the Christians, there would be as few of them left
as possible.’’34
On 18 August 1915, the Swedish Ambassador notified Stockholm about a new
German protest against the ongoing massacres. The German Ambassador’s note con-
tained a ‘‘much more serious tone,’’ pointing out that Germany could not passively
witness ‘‘how Turkey, through the Armenian persecutions, was going downhill,
morally and economically. Furthermore, they [the Germans] protested against the
Porte’s course of actions, based on which her [i.e., Turkey’s] ally Germany becomes
suspected of approving these actions and, finally, Germany renounces any responsi-
bility for the consequences.’’35 On 2 September 1915, Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a new
report stating that it ‘‘ is obvious that the Turks are taking the opportunity to, now
during the war, annihilate [utpla˚na] the Armenian nation so that when peace comes,
the Armenian question no longer exists . . . It is noteworthy that the persecutions
of Armenians have been done at the instigation of the Turkish government and
are primarily not a spontaneous eruption of Turkish fanaticism, even though this
fanaticism is used and plays a role. The tendency to ensure that Turkey is inhabited
only by Turks could, in due time, appear in a horrifying manner toward the Greeks
and other Christians also.’’36 Anckarsva¨rd made it quite clear that the massacres
were neither an act of vengeance, nor a matter of civil or domestic war, but a
systematic killing planned and implemented by the state, that is, a genocide. Thus,
Turkey was behaving as a failed state, in which the structure and the norms for
safeguarding the human rights of its citizens were suspended or ignored.37
The dispatch of 4 September 1915 presented the estimation of the Armenian
losses given by the Armenian Patriarch. Anckarsva¨rd confirmed the Patriarch’s
estimation that approximately half the Armenian population had been erased, but
doubted that the Armenian population was as numerous as 2 million, which the
Patriarch asserted. Anckarsva¨rd also noted the negative economic impact these
persecutions had in Turkey, since almost 80% of the trade was in Armenian hands.38
On 4 October 1915, SvM claimed that the US ambassador in Constantinople,
Henry Morgenthau, had been ordered by his government to deliver a warning to the
Turkish foreign minister, stating that ‘‘ if the Armenian massacres do not cease, the
friendly relations with the US will be jeopardized.’’39 However, a similar directive
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was never issued by Stockholm. Instead of exhorted protests, the Swedish press now
started to question the credibility of the news, citing the Turkish government’s
explanation that the measures were necessary because of the Armenian’s liaisons
with the Russians, British, and the French.40 Nevertheless, 1915 was replete with
notes and reports about the state-implemented annihilation and extermination of
the Armenian nation. The ambassador alone dispatched over ten reports about the
persecution of the Armenians and their fate.
On 15 January 1916, Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a report written by the Swedish
Military Attache´ Wirse´n, in which the situation of the military operations in Turkey
was described. Commenting on the shortage of food, the report pointed out that
this was partly as a result of bad harvests in Anatolia. The bad harvests were due
to lack of labor since ‘‘so many men had been enlisted and in large areas, the
most able-bodied population, i.e. the Armenians, have been subjected to the saddest
fate . . .’’41 On 13 March 1916, Wirse´n noted the tension surrounding the German
officers, which was affecting their relations with the Turks. He assumed that some-
thing was about to happen at the Caucasian front, but the outcome was uncertain.
He concluded the paragraph with the following sentence: ‘‘One can observe that the
persecution of the Armenians has now begun in Thrace and even in Constantinople
itself, when the Armenians living in the eastern parts of the city have begun being
transported away to Asia.’’42 Commenting on the general situation in May, Wirse´n
points out the main source for the epidemics spreading in the eastern front: ‘‘The
health situation in Iraq is horrifying. Typhus fever claims numerous victims. The
Armenian persecutions have to a large degree contributed to the spreading of the
disease, since the expelled [Armenians] in hundreds of thousands have died from
hunger and deprivation along the roads.’’43
In his dispatch, dated 20 May 1916, Ambassador Anckarsva¨rd reported on the
ongoing negotiations between Turkey and Germany, commenting on the situation in
Turkey and the rumors of a possible surrender. Talking about the possible assaults
on foreigners in Turkey and the subsequent foreign intervention, Anckarsva¨rd
asserts that a foreign intervention would only weaken the Turkish Empire, but his
analysis leaves no other option:
It is only due to the war that an ultra terrorist regime such as the present can be
upheld. The true nature of this regime has come to the surface in such a significant
manner through the Armenian persecutions. That the same violent methods are still
implemented is evident through the recent intelligence reports regarding measures
for subjugating agitation among Arabs . . . In Aleppo there are rumors regarding an
imminent deportation of the Arabs in hundreds of thousands. Such is the Young
Turk administration, so incompetent is it in solving the difficult problems posed
by the heterogeneous elements that the population is composed of. The military
successes, thanks to German aid, should not create the illusion that Turkey will
be re-born thanks to the war. The stub is so corroded that a real regeneration is
inconceivable.44
Thus, Anckarsva¨rd predicted that, even though an intervention might not be the
perfect answer, it might be the only alternative since no change would come from
within to improve the situation of the minorities. However, the war gave the perfect
opportunity to act as a failed state without fearing external interference.
On 7 June 1916, Dagens Nyheter reported that in Trabizond, for every 10,000
Armenian inhabitants, only 92 were still alive. ‘‘The extermination of the Armenians
has been done systematically.’’45 The Swedish passivity in response to the reported
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atrocities was criticized by editor G.H. von Kock, who not only criticized the
government but also the church: ‘‘It is with sorrow one notes that, since the initial
notification of the issue, nothing or at least very little has been done to assist the
Christian Armenians and Syrians who in Asia Minor have been murdered in
the hundreds of thousands by Turks and Kurds . . . Sometimes it feels that we,
here in Sweden, have been paralyzed in the face of all misery that now prevails and
increases constantly in the world.’’46
Almost a month later, Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a report notifying Stockholm of
the possibility of a Greek declaration of war against Turkey, which could result in
the repetition of the Armenian fate, this time engulfing the Greeks in Turkey. The
report is significant due to the expected request for protection of Greek interests in
Turkey: ‘‘[T]he Dutch Ambassador here has notified his government, that in case of
a possible request from Greece regarding entrusting the protection of its interests
in Turkey to the Dutch legation, it must be denied. The Foreign Ministry in [The]
Hague has replied that it completely approves the Ambassador’s view. On my own
behalf, I would like respectfully make the same proposal to Your Excellency as
it concerns this embassy, in case the government in Athens would turn to H[is]
M[ajesty]’s government.’’47 This is the only instance where Anckarsva¨rd recom-
mended a certain policy to Stockholm regarding the events in Turkey. It also
illustrates how the fear of endangering one’s own country’s interests could directly
prevent that country from intervening in case of a humanitarian urgency. This policy
would become much more obvious once the new Swedish ambassador arrived in
1920.
In his dispatch on 5 January 1917, Anckarsva¨rd made an important observation
of the German influence in Turkey in regard to the impending risk of Turkish
surrender: ‘‘The situation would have been different if Turkey had followed the
advice of the Central Powers in letting them organise the question of provisioning
etc. . . . Even worse than this is, however, the extermination [utrotandet] of Armenians,
which, perhaps, could have been prevented if German advisers had in time received
authority over the civilian administration as the German officers actually practise
over army and navy . . . The above-mentioned statements, as mentioned, come from
a diplomatic official allied with Turkey. Your Excellency can then consider what the
neutral diplomats think of the situation here.’’48
On 14 January 1917, Anckarsva¨rd sent a dispatch regarding the decision to
deport the Ottoman Greeks. He noted that the US ambassador had been trying to
stop the deportation by stressing to the Porte the kind of impression ‘‘a repetition
of the Armenian persecutions, but this time against the Greeks, would give in the
entire civilised world.’’ He ended the report by asserting the following: ‘‘What above
all appears as an unnecessary cruelty is that the deportation is not limited to the
men alone, but is extended likewise to women and children. This is supposedly done
in order to much more easily confiscate the property of the deported.’’49
The Armenian question was revived in 1917 in Sweden. Then, even writers and
politicians joined the debate. The Turkish embassy in Stockholm got engaged in the
debate, refuting the allegations presented in the Swedish press. On March 24,
Dagens Nyheter published the parliamentary interpellation, written by Stockholm’s
Mayor Carl Lindhagen to Foreign Minister Johannes Hellner, stating, ‘‘Earlier
cruelties in Armenia fade in the face of the actual extermination [utrotandet] of
the Armenians, which recently has been going on.’’ He continued, asking whether
‘‘the government, alone or in cooperation with other neutral governments, who could
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have any influence in the matter, wish to help the right of the Armenian population
to protect their lives, their property and their nationality?’’50
As an answer to Mayor Lindhagen’s interpellation to the Swedish foreign
minister, Chairman of the Conservative Parliamentary Group Arvid Lindman
rejected any claim for intervention, referring to the fact that Sweden will not inter-
fere in other state’s internal affairs.51 The leader of the opposition, Chairman of the
Social Democratic Party Hjalmar Branting, mentioned that Sweden should protest
against the Armenian massacres in the same way Sweden protested against the
‘‘catastrophe in Belgium.’’52 However, no protest was ever issued. On March 26, a
protest meeting was arranged in support of the Armenians. In a packed auditorium
in Stockholm, the meeting was presided over by Mayor Lindhagen, and Hjalmar
Branting gave the introductory speech. The keynote speech was delivered by the
author Marika Stjernstedt. The French, Russian, Belgian, and Italian ambassadors
also attended the meeting and funds were raised.53 Talking about the Armenian
massacres during the last decades of nineteenth century, Branting rebuked the
conservative newspapers for having practically silenced the information on the
massacres, stating that the world had ‘‘witnessed that in Armenia, a fully organized
genocide [ folkmord] has been carried out and the events down there are unparalleled
with all that which has happened during the war.’’54 Branting might very well have
been the first public figure who, decades before Raphael Lemkin, used the term
folkmord, that is genocide, in regard to the annihilation of a nation. Branting also
informed the audience that he, back in 1916, had contacted the then foreign minister
Knut Wallenberg to make him intervene and put a stop to the massacres. The
courting had been fruitless.55 It should be borne in mind that at this point in time,
Branting was the opposition leader, chastising the government for its Germanophile
attitudes and indifference in the face of an obvious humanitarian disaster. He would
have the chance to address the issue when he became prime minister, which I will
touch upon later. The meeting infuriated the Turkish mission in Stockholm, which
published an article in SvM explaining that the Turkish government, at the
beginning of the war, had cautioned all that there would be ‘‘severe punishment for
attempts of rebellion. Armenians continued with their old policy, and a bloodbath
and attacks on Turks began—in other words, all symptoms for a total insur-
rection.’’56 Nine days later, Stjernstedt published a passionate article about the
Armenian massacres, citing new testimonies verifying the accusations against the
Turks.57
In a 20 August 1917 report about the impact of the war on Turkey, the territorial
losses, as well as the impact on the society, the Swedish Envoy Ahlgren identifies the
following causes for increased living costs: ‘‘obstacles for domestic trade, the almost
total paralyzing of the foreign trade, and finally the strong decreasing of labor power,
caused partly by the mobilization but also by the extermination of the Armenian race
[utrotandet af den armeniska rasen].’’58 Thus, Ahlgren concurred with Anckarsva¨rd’s
view when describing the true goal of the massacres and the nature of the Armenian
fate. The analysis of the situation was elaborated in more detail soon after in the
report about the new masters of Turkey, the ‘‘Young Turks.’’ In a dispatch on 10
September 1917, Ahlgren gives a detailed description of the Union and Progress
Party. The Turkish policy prior to the war was that of ‘‘Ottomanism,’’ aiming to
homogenize the disintegrating heterogenic empire that until then was kept together
by autocracy. However, the new leaders realized that Ottomanism threatened the
Turkish element, since other subdued people ‘‘demanded equal rights for themselves
as the Turks: security for life and property, access to the civil and the military
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offices, yes, even to government.’’59 In order to prevent this, Talaat and Enver,
through the coup d’e´tat in 1913, eliminated the liberal government, and started
implementing changes in the constitution for improving the rights of the Turkish
element. Referring to the new Turkish leader’s policy of homogenizing Turkey,
Ahlgren asserts that this was being planned by ‘‘assimilating other nationalities
and, when it failed, soon enough through political persecutions and extermination.
It is in the light of these facts that one should regard the measures taken against
the Armenians and maybe future similar [actions] against the Greeks.’’60 All opposi-
tion had been brutally removed, all major positions within the administration were
appointed to loyal people, and a new police force was created to act as a secure tool
in the government’s hand. The same applied to the army.61 The government was in
full control over the country.
In 1918, after a conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Nessimy Bey,
Anckarsva¨rd sent a letter to Stockholm, dated 22 April, reporting on the information
he had received from the minister. Nessimy Bey had refuted the recent news about
renewed Armenian massacres, calling them British propaganda and had pointed out
that their previous sufferings were due to the Armenians’ own rebellious posture
and the subsequent evacuation. ‘‘But,’’ Anckarsva¨rd added, ‘‘to just recently [and]
unnecessary subject the Armenians to new sufferings could not be comprehended
by any reasonable person in Turkey, since this would further nourish the already
prevailing indignation toward Turkey.’’62 In other words, Anckarsva¨rd hinted at
existing foreign resentment towards Turkey and its treatment of the Armenian
subjects, even though a strong condemnation of the actions was conspicuous by
its absence. On 25 August, Ahlgren reported on the ongoing peace negotiations in
Caucasus between Turkey and the newly created Caucasian republics of Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Mentioning the Turkish push eastward, into Caucasus
towards Baku and beyond, he notes that the territorial demands of the Georgian
and Azerbaijani republics were mostly met by Turkey, while the original Armenian
claims to a territory of 45,000 square kilometers were limited to only 11,000 square
kilometers, largely encompassing the Erivan province. ‘‘Thus, Armenia was heavily
circumscribed, but this is less surprising than that the Turks have, at all, decided
to recognize an independent Armenian state, which conspicuously contradicts their
implemented policy since 1915, which strove to solve the Armenian question by the
extermination of the Armenian race [den armeniska rasens utrotande].’’63 However,
Ahlgren noted that the Turkish recognition was not voluntary, but due to German
persuasion. Nevertheless, the Turkish offensive towards Baku was halted by the
signing of the armistice at Mudros, by which Turkey surrendered on 30 October
1918.64 The Turkish reconciliation measures would continue in 1919.
It is noteworthy to mention a dispatch that Anckarsva¨rd sent to Stockholm on 8
October 1918. The dispatch contained a debriefing on Anckarsva¨rd’s audience at
Crown Prince Abdul Medjid’s court. The prince had dismissed the Talaat cabinet
due to its misrule of the country and especially lost confidence, internally as well as
externally, due to ‘‘two unforgivable errors, which in the eyes of Turkey and abroad,
made them unsuitable for running the country, namely partly the Armenian persecu-
tions, and partly the exaggerated cruelties committed in Syria against the conspiracy-
entangled Arab sheiks.’’65 There are two important notes in this dispatch: (1) the
Turkish rule indicated a failed state, misgoverning the country in general and not
only in regard to the minorities; (2) the Turkish reaction, here by the Crown Prince,
admitted to the knowledge of the atrocities long before the Entente powers exerted
pressure on defeated Turkey and subsequent trials.
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On 10 January 1919, Anckarsva¨rd reported on the future prospects of Turkey. A
major issue mentioned in the report was the future of Cilicia (and also Diarbekir),
whether the important and rich province would be included in the planned indepen-
dent Armenia, or left to Turkey. This report was one of the first of many from
Constantinople to Stockholm, indicating the impact of the creation of Armenia and
the affected Turkish finances. The main issue was how to salvage Turkey from an
impending financial catastrophe, and more importantly, how to save foreign capital
invested in Turkey. Anckarsva¨rd notes that a French adviser, commenting on the
financial situation in Turkey, advises that ‘‘Turkey must be saved from bankruptcy
and at the same time save the considerable French and English capital here in
Turkey. ‘The Entente’ should, in its own interest, not ruin Turkey, which they hope,
in the future, to fully be able to control and exploit freely.’’66 Anckarsva¨rd concludes:
‘‘The cliche´ states that one does not ruin one’s debtor, and the question is, whether
one should best draw conclusions from this thesis.’’ Future reports, mentioned later,
will further illuminate the implementation of this thesis by the foreign powers in
regard to Armenia and Turkey.
Until this point, the embassy dispatches clearly stated that there were large-
scale massacres with the aim of annihilating the Armenian nation. There had been
some Armenian revolutionary activities, partly due to the Turkish atrocities com-
mitted in the past, but the scale of these and other actions were hardly reason to
exterminate the entire Armenian nation. Furthermore, the dispatches pointed out,
on more than one occasion, that the Armenian massacres were not a result of
spontaneous public actions, but government orchestrated implementation of erasing
a nation. Thus, it is safe to say that the Swedish government’s policies, irrespective
of the additional information provided by domestic newspapers and missionaries,
were, based solely on dispatches from its foreign and military missions, well
informed of the ongoing eradication of the Armenian nation.
However in 1920, with the arrival of a new Swedish envoy to Constantinople,
the tone of the reports and analysis changed dramatically, at least in regard to
Armenians and the Armenian question. The new envoy was Gustaf Oskar Wallenberg,
former Swedish envoy to Japan, and half-brother to K.A. Wallenberg, the former
Swedish foreign minister. He represented a completely new breed of diplomats in
the Swedish Foreign Office. He differed from the traditional Swedish diplomats
in several ways: He was no career diplomat, but rather a businessman, a fact
that can definitely be ascribed to his family background. He belonged to the wealthy
Wallenberg clan, by far Sweden’s family of financial leaders. However, despite his
plutocratic background, he was not from an aristocratic family, which was the case
for Swedish diplomats normally.67 Furthermore, he was an energetic advocate for
Swedish trade interests, both in existing markets, and especially in new emerging
ones.68 The latter aspect is quite evident in the studied material as well. While
Wallenberg’s predecessor, Anckarsva¨rd, primarily reported on the military and diplo-
matic issues, Wallenberg’s reports are replete with comments on trade possibilities,
strategies for expansion of Swedish export to the region, etc.
On 26 January 1920, the Swedish Foreign Ministry sent a letter marked
‘‘Strictly Confidential’’ [Stra¨ngt Fo¨rtroligt] to its ambassadors in Oslo, Helsinki,
Berlin, Vienna, The Hague, Bern, Rome, and London, as well as to Lieutenant
Colonel Francke at the General Staff ’s headquarters. The attachment to the letter
is an anonymous report from ‘‘a Swede, who has been staying in Constantinople
for a long time.’’69 The report in question completely refutes the massacres: ‘‘The
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talk about massacres of the ‘Christians’ and so on is undoubtedly absolutely untrust-
worthy; it is characteristic that there are no offered verifiable details, ‘the national
forces’ are presented only in general as massacrers, but does anyone ask for
proof ?’’70 The dispatch statement asserts that the news is due to the ‘‘irresponsible
agitation against Turkey, which, since the truce, has been allowed to be carried out
by more or less loathsome Levantine elements . . .’’71 There is no clarification
in regard to these ‘‘Levantine elements,’’ even though one could assume the
nationalities—Armenian and Greek—that the author has in mind.
On 12 April 1920, the Swedish Embassy sent a dispatch entitled ‘‘regarding the
future position of Armenia,’’ asking Stockholm about the League Council’s decision to
find a ‘‘civilized state that wished to accept the responsibility of mandate [power]
over Armenia under the supervision of the League of Nations.’’72 During a con-
versation, M.J. Gout, Chief of French Affairs in the League of Nations, had told the
Swedish envoy that ‘‘ it would be extremely desirable if one or several states, who
might be inclined to accept this significantly important and humanitarian task . . .’’
The embassy concluded the message by offering further information if Stockholm
was to be inclined to accept the offer.73 On 24 April, a telegram was received
in Stockholm, referring to newspapers claiming that either Holland, Sweden, or
Norway intended to take the mandate role. In any case, the USA would assume the
responsibility for the economic aid. According to additional information, the final
decision was postponed, awaiting the statement of the International Commission.74
On 26 April 1920, however, G.O. Wallenberg dispatched a three-page recommen-
dation to Foreign Minister Erik Palmstierna, in which he pointed out the importance
of dropping any support for the Armenian cause for the sake of Swedish interests in
Turkey and the region. He went quite far in justifying his point of view by, among
other things, asserting that the ‘‘Armenian national character is highly unreliable,
something which, by the way, is nothing to be surprised about a people, whose policy
for centuries has been restricted to the fields of intrigue . . . The representatives of
the mandate power there will risk being used for aims that they will not like; and if
there be any scandals, the Armenians will always let them bear the responsibility.’’75
The content of the report can only be seen as a clear attempt to downplay the
need for Swedish involvement based on moral and humanitarian issues. Wallenberg
approached the problem from a purely realistic perspective, safekeeping Swedish
economic and political interests. Armenia, unlike its neighbors, had nothing to offer
Sweden. Wallenberg made this utterly clear and would continue this rhetoric in
order to diminish the Armenian position in the equation. It is especially worth
noting that his analysis and observations strongly contradict both his predecessor’s
views and those of Wirse´n. Wallenberg was a businessman, interested in profits, not
in humanitarian responsibilities. During the subsequent years, Wallenberg con-
tinued his negative attitude toward the Armenians and the Armenian question. He
dismissed the claims that there were any Armenians in Turkey whatsoever, but
there were ‘‘Turks of Christian faith.’’ To verify that there was no Armenian com-
munity in Turkey, Wallenberg cites an Armenian lawyer who said: ‘‘We are Turks
and wish to remain that way.’’76 Later Wallenberg asserts that the Armenians do
not have a future anyway. In Turkey, practically all ‘‘so-called Armenians speak
Turkish,’’ and ‘‘in the Soviet Union, they will surely be Russified.’’77 Furthermore,
he claimed that the effort to create an independent Armenia was entirely a desire
of diasporic Armenians, who were ‘‘rootless nationalists,’’ and had no anchorage
whatsoever among Armenians in Armenia. In this regard he compared the Armenian
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exile organizations with the Zionist movement, comparing the Turkish Armenians to
the Palestinian Jews, criticizing their co-nationalists in the diaspora.78
On 22 October 1920, news was received about Armenia’s request for Entente
assistance due to an ultimatum from Soviet Russia. Citing Inde´pendance Belge,
Dagens Nyheter reported that ‘‘the League of Nations, in regard to Armenia, has
proposed that the Supreme Council should appoint a mandate power for Armenia.’’79
The issue of a Swedish mandate over Armenia was brought up during the autumn
session of the League of Nations. On 20 November 1921, the League had its first
General Assembly, with Hjalmar Branting as the leader of the Swedish delegation.
The meeting had received numerous telegrams from Armenian organizations in
France, Turkey, Romania, USA, and Egypt, among other places, appealing to the
members of the League to save Armenia.80 In terms of the Grotian definition, these
appeals were the calls from the suppressed subjects asking for foreign intervention
as a refined form of ‘‘just war.’’81 Referring to the telegrams and the appeal of
the Armenians, the Yugoslavian delegate asked the major powers to intervene. The
humanitarian intervention was not only a rescue mission, but also a peacekeeping
one. Thereafter, Branting took the podium, seconding the previous speakers,
demanding that the major powers intervene in the matter.82 Thus, one could
conclude that, in Branting’s view, the intervention was not only a moral duty for
protecting the human rights and the security of the Armenian subjects in Turkey,
but also that the whole situation posed a threat to international security and
the newly established League of Nations. Both France and England declined the
mandate, referring to the fact that they already had accepted mandate missions.
Upon receiving the news, Swedish Prime Minister Louis De Geer the Younger
immediately telegrammed back to the League, declining the mandate over Armenia,
due to ‘‘the distance between the countries, and the complex and grave nature of
the Armenian problem.’’83 Norway’s telegram was, literally, a carbon copy of the
Swedish reply, while the Danish answer was also the same in its content.84
On November 23, Nya Dagligt Allehanda published an article posing the follow-
ing question: ‘‘Shall the Armenian question lead to the creation of an international
police force?’’85 This also might be the very first occasion when the need of an inter-
national peacekeeping force had arisen. That the League was unwilling or unable
to make any commitment in regard to the Armenian question in the hour of need
was exposed by the Social-Demokraten correspondent in Geneva, who wrote, ‘‘The
civilized nations looked at each other, a bit ashamed indeed and each and everyone
whispered their answer to the Council: ‘Surely Armenia must be aided. It is a
responsibility toward all humanity to aid Armenia. It must not happen that Armenia
is not aided. But why should I do it? Why should I? Why should I?’ was sounded
from every direction. ‘Why exactly should I expose myself for the risk and the incon-
venience of putting my nose in this robber’s den?’ And so all the civilized nations
there stood on the shore, around the drowning people, each and everyone with
its lifeline in hand. But no one wanted or dared to throw it, fearing they would
themselves be drawn into the water.’’86 The world community obviously saw the
problem and expressed its sympathy, but that was all. Armenia was simply not
worth the risk. Whoever engaged in accepting mandate power over Armenia would
risk both being burdened with expenses and getting involved in conflict with the
economically and politically more adept neighbors such as Turkey, Azerbaijan,
and Russia. The responses from almost all countries declining participation, who
acknowledged the need for humanitarian intervention, illustrates that while there
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is sufficient will to intervene, there is insufficient will to devote resources to the
cause.
On 19 October 1921, Wallenberg wrote yet another letter in regard to the possi-
ble request by the League of Nations for Sweden to act as guarantor for a temporary
Armenian government in Cilicia. The prospects for such a request looked quite slim,
but nonetheless, Wallenberg’s recommendation, based on the same reasons he had
provided about the suggestion concerning the mandate power, was to decline such
a request.87 Commenting on the issue of non-interference in a sovereign state’s
internal affairs, he notes that ‘‘to seek to make an international issue of this would,
at its core, be the same as choosing to raise the principle that states would no longer
legally have the right to take measures against plots regarding their security.’’88 On
15 November 1921, the economic worth of a close relation with Constantinople was
made more clear when Wallenberg dispatched a four-page report analyzing the
development in the Black Sea region, in which he repeatedly emphasized the
renewed importance of Constantinople, pointing out (mentioned twice and under-
lined on pages 1 and 4) that ‘‘the road to the new Russian market does not pass
over the Baltic Sea any more, but over Constantinople and the Black Sea ports.’’89
Swedish trade and economic interests in Turkey were far more important than any
humanitarian-related problem.
Conclusion
Taking the data at hand into consideration, it is clear that the information regarding
the massacres in the Ottoman Empire and their genocidal nature was abundant in
Swedish newspapers as well as in the reports submitted to the Church of Sweden,
the Swedish Defense Ministry, and the Swedish foreign ministry and government.
It is safe to assert that the Swedish government had a clear view of what transpired
in Western Armenia during the Great War. Even if one were to disregard the
information presented by the missionaries and the press, the Swedish Government,
especially through its embassy in Constantinople, as well as through its military
attache´ in Turkey, was well informed about the ongoing annihilation. In his dis-
patches to Stockholm, Ambassador Anckarsva¨rd stressed the fact that what took
place in the Ottoman Empire was neither an act of mutual killing, nor measures
taken against Armenian insurrection, but a well-planned systematic annihilation
of the Armenian nation, initiated and implemented by the Turkish government.
Indeed, the reports tell of Armenian collaboration with the Russian Army and armed
resistance in some places, and they also make clear that 1) the acts of vengeance
occurred long after the bulk of the 1915–1916 massacres and deportations, thus
the government’s actions can not be justified as measures against insurgency and
treason; 2) the cooperation with the enemy was to a very limited extent and could
not justify the implemented annihilation of the entire Armenian nation. This view
was further verified by the information and testimonies published by the Swedish,
as well as Danish, Norwegian, German, and American missionaries and relief
workers who had returned home during the last years of the war. The reports also
indicate that the Turkish government relied on the fact that, as long as the war
was going on, the world would be unable to intervene. By the time the war ended,
the genocide had taken its toll, emptying Western Armenia of its Armenians. This,
in part, legitimated claims that it was impossible to create an Armenia based on
national self-determination, simply because there were no Armenians left to make
this decision. The date of the first classified diplomatic intelligence indicates that
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Stockholm received an early warning and was notified of the ongoing humanitarian
catastrophe during the first steps of the large-scale massacres and deportations.
Later reports further indicated that Turkey’s actions illustrated a state violating
the rights and safekeeping of its citizens. That is to say, Turkey was a failed state,
which in turn could justify a humanitarian intervention.
A limited number of politicians, such as Hjalmar Branting, appealed to the
Swedish public to influence Swedish decision making, but there are no indications
in the data studied that suggest any effect in this matter. It seems that only the
missionaries took action and, where and when possible, did everything in their
power to give shelter to the victims, actively worked to provide assistance and food
for the deportees, and saved as many as possible from executions, etc. Ambassador
Anckarsva¨rd, despite his clear knowledge of the situation, refrained from making
any official recommendations to his government in regard to this issue, or to ask
Stockholm about any possible directives. Having said that, one must be reminded
that Anckarsva¨rd remarked on the moral aspects of the annihilation policy and that
the Turkish government made itself guilty of committing crimes against humanity,
but his diplomatic position and obedience to the neutrality policy did not allow him
to act. Unlike Anckarsva¨rd, Wallenberg played an active role in Stockholm’s decision
making, or at least influencing the basis for it, by openly advocating a specific policy
in regard to the Armenian question. Wirse´n, too, had a comprehensive knowledge
about the annihilation, but as a military envoy might not have had the authority to
make political comments. Only later, when commenting on his experience from the
mission, does Wirse´n describe the massacres and the deportation of the Armenian
nation and try to interpret their true nature and the aims of the Turkish leaders.
As far as the Swedish government is concerned, there will need to be an extended
study of the events in order to comment on the Swedish official action, or the lack
thereof. There are no data indicating that Sweden would have put forward any
protests or pressure for a humanitarian intervention. Nonetheless, the absence of
relevant information does not allow a full interpretation of the official stand. Yet,
later, when the question of a mandate power was brought up, Sweden acted like
other nations, unwilling to be involved in the country so far away. Thus, the wording
of the Swedish correspondent asking ‘‘Why should I?’’ depicts quite well the senti-
ment that prevailed in Sweden in regard to far-away Armenia.
Expanding the horizons of this study, and trying to find out how the Swedish
officials debated the news received about the Armenian massacres, would enable
one to investigate a new perspective on the data presented in this study. How does
a small state respond when confronted with the news about an ongoing humani-
tarian crisis and the option of intervening? What alternatives did Stockholm have,
how did the decision makers debate, and what did they decide? Do massive humani-
tarian crises, such as genocide, challenge the fundamental doctrine of small-state
policies or that of an international organization, such as the UN? How can an
effective humanitarian intervention be implemented in a time of a major regional
or global conflict when the perpetrating side is already at war with the potential
interveners? Is an intervention by foreign states always impossible when genocide
is committed during the course of a global war? Are there any alternative solutions
for a military intervention? In order to address these questions, additional factors
must be added to the equation, such as the dynamics of Sweden’s foreign policy of
abandoning its strict neutrality by engaging in the League of Nations, but also the
perceived imminent threat from the new Bolshevik Russia.
The Armenian Genocide of 1915 from the Perspective of Sweden
337
Notes
1. This article is a short summary of a master’s thesis and, due to space limitations, does
not include the full scope of articles, documents, and reports in regard to the ongoing
genocide in the Ottoman Empire. See Vahagn Avedian, ‘‘The Armenian Genocide 1915:
From a Neutral Small State’s Perspective,’’ (MA thesis, Uppsala University, 2008;
http://www.armenica.org/material).
2. Mariam Bakhtiari, Kalla det vad fan du vill (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2005), 9. In the
Swedish text, ‘‘wogs’’ translates to ‘‘svartskalle,’’ verbatim ‘‘black head,’’ referring to the
dark color of the foreigners, which contrasts to the light brown hair color of the native
Swedes. Also see Tomas Hammar, Sverige a˚t svenskarna: Invandringspolitik, utla¨nning-
skontroll och asylra¨tt, 1900–1932 (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 1964), 69–71.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from non-English sources are my own.
3. One argument used by present-day Turkey to avoid recognition of the 1915 genocide
refers to the alleged difference between ‘‘Ottoman’’ and ‘‘Turkey,’’ asserting that Turkey
did not exist before 1923, nor is the present state responsible for any actions committed
by the Ottoman government. However, when studying the period in question, it becomes
evident that this transformation from Ottoman to Turkey was already ongoing. Several
foreign states, in their diplomatic letters, reports, and documents, use ‘‘Turkey’’ or
‘‘Ottoman Turkey’’ for designating the state. Thus, this article will use Turkey when
referring to the Ottoman Empire. For further discussion, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, The
Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion
and Falsification (Toronto: Zoryan Institute, 1999), 5–6.
4. For further information see Vahakn N. Dadrian, ‘‘The Armenian Question and the
Wartime Fate of the Armenians as Documented by the Officials of the Ottoman Empire’s
World War I Allies: Germany and Austro-Hungary,’’ International Journal of Middle
East Studies 34, no.1 (February 2002): 59–85; Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the
Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus
(Providence, RI: Berghahn, 2004). Also see W.J. van der Dussen, ‘‘The Question of
Armenian Reforms in 1913–1914,’’ The Armenian Genocide, Documentation, vol. 8
(Mu¨nchen: Institut fu¨r Armenische Fragen, 1991).
5. Gunilla Lundstro¨m, Per Ryde´n, and Elisabeth Sandlund, Den svenska pressens historia,
Det moderna Sveriges spegel (1897–1945), vol. 3 (Stockholm: Ekerlid, 2001), 124.
6. Tommy Hansson, Neutralitetsmyten: En granskning av svensk utrikespolitik (Stockholm:
Contra, 1991), 20.
7. Erik Lo¨nneroth, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1959), 27.
8. Maria Anholm, De do¨dsdo¨mda folkens saga (Stockholm: Nordiska o¨resbibliotek, 1906);
E. John Larson, Fo¨rfo¨ljelserna och blodbaden i Armenien : Sa¨rskild fra˚n a˚r 1894 till a˚r
1897 (Helsingborg: Missionsbokhandeln, 1897); Per Pehrsson, Armenierna och deras no¨d
(Stockholm, 1896).
9. Riksarkivet [National Archives] (RA), Swedish missionary letters regarding Armenia.
For Alma Johansson’s description of the Armenian Genocide, see Alma Johansson, Ett
folk i landsflykt: Ett a˚r ur armeniernas historia (Stockholm: Kvinnliga Missions Arbetare,
1930).
10. Gustaf Hjalmar Pravitz, Fra˚n Persien i stiltje och storm (Stockholm: Dahlberg, 1918).
11. Nya Dagligt Allehanda’s German affiliation would bloom into full sympathy for National
Socialism during the 1930s.
12. Pravitz, Fra˚n Persien i stiltje och storm, 222.
13. Nya Dagligt Allehanda (Stockholm), 23 April 1917.
14. Pravitz, Fra˚n Persien i stiltje och storm, 221.
15. Ibid., 22, 226–27.
16. Ibid., 219, 221–23.
17. By a coincidence, Wirse´n is the same Swedish military officer who was appointed as
chairman for the commission that the League of Nations put in charge of arbitration in
the Mosul Crisis. It was Wirse´n’s detailed knowledge of the region, his experiences from
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:3 December 2010
338
the war, and his familiarity with the existing situation that made him an important
asset in the commission appointed to resolve the crisis.
18. Carl Einar af Wirse´n, Minnen fra˚n fred och krig (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1942), 132.
19. Ibid., 133.
20. Ibid., 220–26. Also see 120, 288, and 294.
21. Ibid., 223.
22. Ibid., 223.
23. Ibid., 226. This view is confirmed by Dadrian as well. See Dadrian, The History of the
Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus, 289,
384–85.
24. Wirse´n, Minnen fra˚n fred och krig, 226.
25. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet (Foreign Dept.), 1902 a˚rs dossiersystem, vol. 1148,
No. 99 (30 April 1915), 3.
26. The Sublime Porte refers to the gate of the Ottoman Imperial Government, more specifi-
cally the Foreign Ministry.
27. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 99 (30 April 1915), 5.
28. Svenska Morgonbladet (Stockholm), 26 May 1915.
29. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 137 (6 July 1915).
30. The Committee of Union and Progress (‘‘ I˙ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti’’ in Turkish) was
the central leadership for the movement known in the West as the Young Turks.
31. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 142 (14 July 1915).
32. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 145 (15 July 1915).
33. For the Madagascar Plan, see Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final
Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942 (London:
Heinemann, 2004), 81–83.
34. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 155 (22 July 1915).
35. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 170 (18 August 1915).
36. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 182 (2 September 1915).
37. Barbara von Tigerstrom, Human Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 96, 102–103. Also see Catherine Lu, ‘‘Whose Principles?
Whose Institutions? Legitimacy Challenges for ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ ’’ in Humani-
tarian Intervention, ed. Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (New York: New York
University Press, 2006), 197; Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 18.
38. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1148, No. 183 (4 September 1915).
39. Svenska Morgonbladet, 4 October 1915.
40. Svenska Morgonbladet, 11 October 1915.
41. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, 1902 a˚rs dossiersystem, vol. 1149a, No. 20 (15 January
1916).
42. Krigsarkivet (War Archives), Generalstaben, Letter 13, (13 March 1916).
43. Krigsarkivet, Generalstaben, Letter 8 (13 May 1916).
44. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1149a, No. 80 (20 May 1916).
45. Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), 7 June 1916.
46. Dagens Nyheter, 30 August 1916.
47. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1149a, No. 137 (25 September 1916).
48. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1149a, No. 9 (5 January 1917).
49. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1149a, No. 14 (14 January 1917).
50. Dagens Nyheter, 24 March 1917.
51. Riksdagens arkiv, Andra kammaren, Interpellationer (The Second Chamber of the
Riksdag, Interpellations) 35:29–30 and 62:7–8 (23 March 1917).
52. Riksdagens arkiv, Andra kammaren, Interpellationer, 62:10 (23 March 1917).
53. Svenska Morgonbladet, 28 March 1917.
54. Social-Demokraten (Stockholm) (27 March 1917); Svenska Dagbladet, 28 March 1917.
55. Social-Demokraten, 27 March 1917.
The Armenian Genocide of 1915 from the Perspective of Sweden
339
56. Svenska Morgonbladet, 2 April 1917.
57. Dagens Nyheter, 11 April, 1917.
58. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1149b, No. 232 (20 August, 1917).
59. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1149b, No. 260 (10 September 1917).
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1149b, No. 58 (22 April 1918).
63. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1150, No. 118 (25 August 1918).
64. Hrant Pasdermadjian, Histoire de l’Arme´nie depuis les origines jusqu’au traite´ de
Lausanne, (Paris: Librairie orientale, 1949), 494.
65. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1150, No. 143 (8 October 1918).
66. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. 1150, No. 5 (10 January 1919).
67. Bert Edstro¨m, Storsvensken i yttersta o¨stern: G.O. Wallenberg som svenskt sa¨ndebud i
Japan, 1906–1918 (Stockholm: University Center for Pacific Asia Studies, 1999), 6.
68. Ibid., 13–16.
69. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, 1920 a˚rs dossiersystem, vol. HP 1474, No. 55 (26
January 1920).
70. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. HP 1474, No. 55 (26 January, 1920).
71. Ibid.
72. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. HP 1474, No. 160 (12 April 1920).
73. Ibid.
74. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. HP 904, Telegram, Paris 0305/23 40W 23 18 40,
Cabinet Stockholm (24 April 1920).
75. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. HP 1474, No. 74 (26 April 1920).
76. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. HP 1474, No. 69 (17 March, 1921).
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid. Richard Hovannisian’s excellent and descriptive work, Armenia on the Road to Inde-
pendence, 1918, however, gives a very different image than that depicted by Wallenberg.
See Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1967).
79. Dagens Nyheter, 22 October 1920.
80. Go¨ran Gunner and Erik Lindberg, eds., La¨ngtan till Ararat, En bok om Armenien och
armenisk identitet (Go¨teborg: Gothia, 1985), 273.
81. For the ‘‘Grotian Doctrine’’ on international politics and responsibility, and humanitarian
intervention in particular, see John G. Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for
Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 135.
See also Kok-Chor Tan, ‘‘The Duty to Protect,’’ in Humanitarian Intervention, ed.
Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, 84–116 (New York: New York University Press,
2006), 89.
82. League of Nations, Assembly Protocol (22 November 1920), 187.
83. League of Nations, Official Journal, no. 8 (November–December 1920), 96.
84. Ibid., 96–97.
85. Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 23 November, 1920.
86. Written on November 24 and published in Social-Demokraten, 29 November 1920.
87. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. HP 1474, No. 234 (19 October 1921).
88. Ibid.
89. Riksarkivet, Utrikesdepartementet, vol. HP 566B, No. 267 (15 November 1921).
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:3 December 2010
340
